WebSeasoned compliance specialist and corporate counsel with solid experience in rendering services related to Governance, Risks and Compliance, focusing on the procedures of the Petrobras’s Integrity Due Diligence (IDD) criteria, covering the design, implementation, maintenance, evaluation and improvement of Compliance Programs, such as risk … WebSeries II Horizontal Restraints Module II-2: Leniency. This module introduces the concept of leniency programs for anti-cartel enforcement. The module presents the cornerstones and benefits of an effective leniency program, the procedural aspects of a leniency program, and how leniency interacts with sanctions in a cartel enforcement action.
Designing Corporate Leniency Programs by Miriam H. Baer :: SSRN
WebCiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We develop a simple framework for analyzing the optimal design of leniency programs, which allow cartel members to denounce their collusive agreements. We highlight a basic trade-off between two opposite forces: leniency can destabilize cartels, by encouraging firms to … WebWe develop a simple framework for analyzing the optimal design of leniency programs, which allow cartel members to denounce their collusive agreements. We highlight a … dwarven toolbox
LENIENCY PROGRAM GUIDELINES
WebLeniency programs are effective when there are a number of conditions in place. These include clear and high sanctions for infringements, the probability to detect a cartel is not low (i.e. competition authorities have the appropriate investigative tools to detect and prove cartels), the leniency program’s design WebIn the last 20 years leniency programs have become an important instrument of antitrust authorities and many countries have implemented some type of leniency program. Due to the increasing importance of leniency programs, there has been an on-going discussion about the optimal design of a leniency program. However, Web1 de mar. de 2003 · The key mechanism of leniency programs is the rule that allows firms to receive fine reductions even after an investigation is opened. In this situation, the probability of paying the fine increases compared with the case where firms are not yet under scrutiny, and the exchange of reduced fines with cooperation becomes attractive. crystal douglas georgia